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Abstract
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) protocol is commonly used to establish
Voice over IP (VoIP) calls. IETF SIP standards do not specify a secure authen-
tication process thus allowing malicious parties to impersonate other parties or to
charge calls to other parties. This paper proposes an extension to the SIP protocol
that uses an identity-based authentication mechanism and key agreement protocol.
These extensions provide stronger cryptographic assurances for VoIP authentica-
tion and enable provably secure key agreement between users. The use of ID based
cryptography means that a large Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is not required
thus making this protocol viable for large scale implementation.
1 Introduction
Voice Over IP (VoIP) is growing dramatically in Australia and worldwide, e.g., a West
Australian based ISP signed up 10,000 customers within 3 months of their service going
live [14]. The term VoIP is a generic term given to any technology that enables voice
communication over the Internet, there are many competing technologies beyond those
standardised by the IETF. Some of these other technologies are Skype [21], H.323 [23],
and voice aware IM software.
The most commonly used protocol is the combination of SIP for signalling and RTP
for transmitting voice and/or video. These protocols are standardised by the IETF
and perform their required tasks efficiently. However, due to the lack of basic security
features no fundamental proof of identity, no protection from man in the middle or replay
attacks, and no assurance of privacy is provided. These can manifest themselves as caller
ID spoofing attacks, fraudulent billing, and eavesdropping (with the ability to replay)
either the signalling messages or the media itself.
This paper introduces a new authentication mechanism and key agreement protocol
for SIP using ID-based cryptography that will provide cryptographic assurances to VoIP
communication. These assurances are a step towards addressing the lack of security
mentioned above. The new key agreement protocol utilises the modified protocol 3 (with
a tighter security definition) of Chen & Kudla [7].
1.1 VoIP: SIP and RTP
IETF standardised VoIP is a combination of four predominate standards: RFC3261:
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [18], RFC2327: Session Description Protocol (SDP) [12],
RFC3550: Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [19], and later RFC3711: The Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [3].
SIP is a text based protocol with similar formatting to HTTP capable of operating on
TCP or UDP and handles all the signalling requirements of a VoIP session, it is analogous
to the SS7 [22] protocol in traditional telephony. The role of SIP is to establish streaming
connection between hosts using two primary messages exchanges; INVITE consisting of
a four way handshake (INVITE, RINGING, OK, and ACK) and REGISTER consisting of
(REGISTER, Unauthorised, and OK). The UMTS standard [11] uses a modified version
of SIP to enable multimedia calls between users on 3G networks.
SDP is a descriptive language used to describe the attributes of a media session being
established or reconfigured. SDP messages are attached to the INVITE and OK messages
during a SIP call establishment. The message is made up of a number of key value pairs
called attributes. These attributes include what codecs are available and the IP addresses
and port numbers of stream endpoints.
RTP on the other hand is a UDP based streaming protocol capable of using arbitrary
profiles and parameters. It handles buffering, jitter correction and is reliant upon SIP to
know which profile and codecs to use and which ports to utilise for the media stream.
SRTP is a later extension to RTP which provides cryptographic support for privacy and
integrity.
Unfortunately, SIP and RTP both lack basic security features which have consequences
as negligible as receiving nuisance calls, up to the complete loss of privacy. This lack of
security features fail to provide users and customers with the assurances they have come to
expect from communication using the traditional PSTN. With VoIP becoming more and
more widespread and with some end consumers now using VoIP exclusively, a provably
secure authentication and key agreement mechanism is required for SIP.
1.2 Research Problem
SIP authentication typically uses HTTP Digest [10] authentication. However, digest
authentication is vulnerable to many forms of attack as noted in RFC2617 (HTTP Au-
thentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication), the RFC even refers to Digest as
weak, but an improvement over Basic authentication. It is unfortunate that the IETF
adopted Digest authentication as the default authentication mechanism, although it is
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possible this was done intentionally to keep SIP as HTTP-like as possible, which was a
stated design goal [18].
SIP allows sections of the messages to be encrypted using S/MIME, however S/MIME
is dependent upon a Certificate Authority (CA) and accompanying Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI), and therefore limited by the adoption of such a system. Also, it is possible
that S/MIME is likely to be too heavy for resource constrained handsets.
Secure RTP (SRTP) and the associated Secure Real Time Control Protocol (SRTCP)
provide cryptographic and integrity checks to the media stream through the use of the
Advanced Encryption System (AES) in Counter Mode (CM). However, the master key
that is required by SRTP has no means of being established between two previously
unknown parties. While SIP allows keying material to be sent to the called party by
way of an attribute in the SDP, this is sent in the clear and therefore does not provide
an assurance that a call will be secure from eavesdropping. The IETF is in the process
of standardising MIKEY (Multimedia Internet KEYing) however this is dependent upon
a working, globally available PKI. Additionally, SIP does not provide a mechanism to
authenticate each party in a SIP establishment without the use of a global PKI, which
opens SIP to Caller-ID impersonation and spoofing attacks.
These core problems stem from the fact that the default authentication mechanism is
Digest, which does not perform mutual authentication (introducing Man-in-the-Middle
and session hijack attacks), and the fact that the available means for providing crypto-
graphic protection require a PKI and related CA’s. Even with a deployed PKI, there
currently exists no means for the establishment of a shared session key to provide cryp-
tographic protection for the media session.
1.3 Our Solution
This paper proposes the use of ID-based cryptography [20] as a solution to the authen-
tication and key agreement problems that exist in SIP. This new SIP authentication
mechanism and key agreement protocol provides mutual authentication and provably se-
cure key agreement between previously unknown parties. ID based cryptographic schemes
are a current and active area of research by the cryptographic community and offer the
benefits of public key cryptography without the need for an expensive PKI. This solution
fits neatly in the SIP protocols as described in RFC3261 and is intended to be operable
in the case of intermediary proxies being unaware of the additions.
1.4 Outline of Paper
Section 2 presents some background information on the SIP standard, RFC3261, and
how authentication and key agreement are currently performed. In Section 3, ID-based
cryptography is briefly introduced, followed by a presentation of the improved provably
secure protocol 3 of Chen & Kudla [7], which the new SIP key agreement protocol utilises.
In Section 4 the new SIP authentication mechanism and key agreement protocol is shown.
This is followed by a discussion of the proposed solution and observed limitations in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes with an exploration of possible avenues for future
work.
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2 Current SIP Authentication and Key Agreement
As mentioned previously SIP is a text based protocol similar in formatting to HTTP,
the two most commonly used SIP exchanges are the REGISTER and INVITE exchanges,
respectively used to connect to the network, and establish a call.
2.1 Authentication
SIP has two authentication dialogs: 401 - Unauthorized and 407 - Proxy Authentication
Required. 401 responses are mainly used during REGISTER, while 407 responses are used
during call establishment with intermediary SIP proxies (predominately during INVITE).
SIP presently uses HTTP Digest authentication, with an option to use certificates and a
PKI.
Digest authentication is a challenge response authentication scheme that ensures the
password is never sent in cleartext, and also provides protection against replay attacks
through the use of a nonce. Digest however, does not provide mutual authentication.
Furthermore, Digest depends upon a preestablished relationship between the requester
and responder.
2.2 Key Agreement
As mentioned previously, SRTP can be used to provide confidentiality and integrity for the
media stream, but lacks a mechanism for establishing a master session key. SRTP requires
keying information to be present on both hosts prior to the session being established. Keys
can be sent as part of the SDP message in the INVITE sequence however this information
is sent in the clear. Protecting the SIP exchanges by use of TLS or S/MIME is suggested,
however these options are limited by the necessity of a global PKI.
Another alternative for providing confidentiality and integrity for both SIP and RTP
is the use of IPSec [15] tunnels between endpoints and using IPSec’s associated key agree-
ment protocols (IKEv1 [13], IKEv2 [9]). However, IPSec has a heavy establishment cost
which impacts on the agility of a mobile device in a heterogeneous wireless environment.
3 Identity-based Cryptography
ID-based cryptosystems were first introduced by Shamir in 1984 [20]. The advantage of
these systems is in the easy derivation of an entity’s public key – a function of the entity’s
identity. The entity’s private key can then be calculated by a Trusted Authority (TA),
also known as a Private Key Generator (PKG). TA services would commonly be provided
by a users service provider, employer, or institution, or any body with which the user
would have an out-of-band relationship with. As pointed out in a recent survey [6], the
ID-based public key cryptosystem is viewed as an alternative for certificate-based PKI
as it greatly reduces the problems with key management on a per individual basis (the
obstacle faced in PKI).
In recent years, the potential application of elliptic curve pairings to realise crypto-
graphic structures has resulted in renewed interest in the use of ID-based cryptography
to solve the problem of constructing non-interactive key distribution schemes [6]. To
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illustrate how elliptic curve pairings can be used to build novel cryptographic schemes
with interesting properties, including ID-based key establishment protocols, the reader is
referred to the pairing-based crypto lounge [1].
3.1 Bilinear Maps from Elliptic Curve Pairings
In this section, the mathematical preliminaries required to understand the ID-based pro-
tocol presented in the next section are introduced. Using the notation of Boneh &
Franklin [5], let G1 be an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative
group of the same order q. Assume the existence of a map eˆ from G1 ×G1 to G2. Typi-
cally, G1 will be a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field,
G2 will be a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a related finite field and the map eˆ
will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on the elliptic curve. The mapping
eˆ must be efficiently computable and has the following properties.
Bilinearity. For Q,W,Z ∈ G1, both
eˆ(Q,W + Z) = eˆ(Q,W ) · eˆ(Q,Z) and eˆ(Q + W,Z) = eˆ(Q,Z) · eˆ(W,Z).
Non-Degeneracy. For some elements P,Q ∈ G1, such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1G2 .
Computability. For some elements P,Q ∈ G1, an efficient algorithm exists to compute
eˆ(P,Q).
A bilinear map, eˆ, is said to be an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies all three properties.
Since eˆ is bilinear, the map eˆ is also symmetric.
3.2 An Improved Provably-Secure ID-based Protocol
This paper employs the provably-secure protocol of Chen & Kudla [7] proven secure in
a restrictive adversarial model of Bellare & Rogaway (hereafter referred to as the BR93
model) [4]. In the BR93 model, there exist an all-powerful adversary, A, which is in
control of all the communications that take place between all protocol principals. A does
this by interacting with a set of oracles, each of which represents an instance of a principal
in a specific protocol run. Each principal has an identifier U and oracle ΠsU represents
the actions of principal U in the protocol run indexed by integer s.
Interactions with the adversary are called oracle queries. Each interaction is now
described informally.
Send(U, s,m) This query allows A to make the principal U run the protocol normally.
The oracle ΠsU will return to A the same next message that an honest principal U
would if sent message m according to the conversation so far.
Reveal(U, s) If a session key Ks has previously been accepted by Π
s
U then it is returned
to A. An oracle is called opened if it has been the object of a Reveal query.
Corrupt(U,K) The query returns the oracle’s internal state and sets the long-term key
of U to be the value K chosen by A. A can then control the behaviour of U with
Send queries. A principal is called corrupted if it has been the object of a Corrupt
query.
5
Protocol 3 of Chen & Kudla [7] was proven secure under the restriction that the adversary
is not allowed to make any Reveal query. However, such a restriction means that the
protocol is not secure against known (session) key attacks1 [8].
A revised (provably-secure) protocol in the “full” BR93 model (i.e., without restricting
the adversary from asking the Reveal queries) is obtained by
• using recent results of [8, 16], a small change to the way that session keys are
constructed2 in the ID-based protocol of Chen & Kudla is made, and
• deploying the GAP assumption introduced by Okamoto & Pointcheval [17].
The revised protocol is described in Figure 1. In the protocol, there are two trusted
authorities, say TA1 and TA2, which have public/private key pairs (s1P = PPub(TA1) ∈
G1, s1 ∈ Zq) and (s2P = PPub(TA2) ∈ G1, s2 ∈ Zq) respectively, where P , G1 and G2 are
globally agreed (e.g., recommended by an international standards body). There are two
entities in the protocol, namely an initiator, A, and a responder, B. A registers with TA1
and gets her private key SA = s1QA and B registers with a different TA, TA2 and gets
his private key SB = s2QB, where QA = H(IDA), QB = H(IDB), and H denote some
secure cryptographic hash function.
The protocol begins by having A randomly select a random challenge, a ∈R Z
∗
q,
compute the ephemeral public keys, TA = aP , and then send it to B with whom she
desires to communicate. Upon receiving the message TA from A, B also randomly selects
a random challenge, b ∈R Z
∗
q, computes the ephemeral public keys, TB = bP , and sends TB
back to A. Note that both a and b are the ephemeral private keys of A and B respectively.
At the end of the protocol execution, both A and B compute a shared session key SKAB
and SKBA independently. Let || denote the concatenation of messages; H1 denote some
secure cryptographic hash function independent of H; and T rA and T rB denote a record
of the transcript of messages sent and received by both parties, which should be identical
in the presence of a benign adversary.
4 A New Authentication and Key Agreement Pro-
tocol for SIP
The previous section introduced elliptic curve cryptography and the application of curve
pairings to an ID-based cryptosystem. In particular the improved Chen & Kudla [7]
protocol 3 key agreement is described which is utilised in the new SIP key agreement
proposed below. This section describes two independent extensions to the SIP protocol,
the first being an ID-based authentication mechanism for use by the two authentication
1We advocate that such an attack is realistic in a real world setting as it is normal to assume that a
host can establish several concurrent sessions with one or more different parties. Sessions are specific to
both the communicating parties. In the case of key establishment protocols, sessions are specific to both
the initiator and the responder principals, where every session is associated with a unique session key.
Therefore, learning session keys from any session different from the one under attack should not enable
the adversary to learn anything about the session key associated with the session under attack.
2We note that such a key derivation function method is recently included in the special publication by
NIST (SP 800-56A – Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Loga-
rithm Cryptography) (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html), March 2006.
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A B
a ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = aP ∈ G1−−−−−−−→ b ∈R Z
∗
q
KAB = eˆ(SA, TB) · eˆ(QB, as2P )
TB = bP ∈ G1←−−−−−−− KBA = eˆ(SB, TA) · eˆ(QA, bs1P )
T rA = TA||TB T rB = TA||TB
SKAB = H1(A||B||T rA||KAB) SKBA = H1(A||B||T rB||KBA)
SKAB = SKBA
Figure 1: The improved provably-secure ID-based protocol 3 of Chen & Kudla
types in SIP. The second is an extension to the SDP messaging format to cater for an
ID-based key agreement protocol implementing the improved Chen & Kudla [7] protocol
3 shown in Figure 1.
The goals of the extended SIP authentication and key agreement protocols were to
achieve an assurance of privacy that was equal to or better than what could be expected
from the traditional PSTN. More specifically, the extensions need to provide protection
from Caller-ID spoofing, resistance to Man-in-the-Middle and session hijack attacks, non-
repudiation, proof of identity and protection from eavesdropping. To support these goals,
the extension will also require mutual authentication, protection from replay attacks as
well as a key escrow facility for law enforcement.
Using ID-based cryptography allows the use of the user’s SIP identity (user@domain)
as the user’s public key (Q), when hashed with some designated hash function, H. The
service provider ensures that the client is correctly identified using a mechanism such as
the 100 points ID check and then issue the corresponding private key to the user. The
TA’s public key (PPubTA) and the users public/private key pair (Q and S) are stored
securely by the user, either on the device or some tamper evident storage mechanism
such as the widely used SIM card in current mobile telephony.
4.1 A New Authentication Mechanism for SIP
Alice Server
401: Unauthorised, Sign(nonce,realm,opaque,time,Alice)
←−−−−−−−
Authorization, Sign(nonce,realm,opaque,Alice,response)
−−−−−−−→
Figure 2: Example ID-based authentication
SIP has two types of authentication distinguished by the response codes 401 and 407.
These are generally required during an INVITE or REGISTER handshake and refer to service
authentication and proxy authentication respectively. The method of authentication
is the same in each case and the SIP extension for authentication provides that same
functionality.
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The new SIP authentication mechanism proposed here provides mutual authentica-
tion, prevention from replay attacks, and non-repudiation while operating within the
semantics required by RFC2617 HTTP Authentication.
4.1.1 Assumptions
The correct and secure operation of this protocol depends upon a number of realistic
assumptions. It is assumed that all parties have globally agreed upon elliptic curve
parameters: P , G1, and G2, such as would be defined by an appropriate standards body.
Furthermore it is assumed that all private keys remain private and secure, and that nonces
will be a function of the realm and time, and will not be reused. Lastly, it is assumed
that the TA’s of security domains can be trusted to provide a true and accurate account
of subscribers, and that TA’s are accessible by all entities in the system. Informally, the
system remains secure in the event of a malicious TA provided that TA’s do not collude.
4.1.2 Description
The proposed ID-based authentication handshake is similar to the challenge response
handshake of Digest, and as stated can operate without changing the semantics of
RFC2617 HTTP Authentication. The handshake is described here:
1. Client makes request of a SIP service requiring authentication (eg REGISTER or
INVITE).
2. Server responds with 401 Unauthorized or 407 Proxy Authentication Required
as appropriate. This response is a challenge consisting of: a realm string, nonce,
opaque string, current time, and claimed identity of the Client, signed with that
security domains long term private key, sj. The realm string is a human read-
able identifier of the security domain, such as the name of the service provider or
network. An opaque string is used as a session identifier.
3. Client verifies the server response against the signature using PPubTA, and calculates
the nonce using the supplied time and realm and compares with the nonce sent
from the Server. The addition of the clients claimed identity in the server response
protects against a man in the middle attack. Requiring the client to generate the
nonce and compare it with the server supplied nonce allows the client to protect
against nonce reuse as the client can disallow a nonce generated from a time outside
a preconfigured threshold.
4. Client prepares a response consisting of a secure hash of the username, realm, nonce
and opaque string signed with their private key, Si. The Client sends the signed
response along with their username, realm, nonce and opaque string in cleartext to
the entity requesting authentication.
5. Server verifies the response with Qi respectively. Again, due to the nature of identity
based encryption, Qi is a function of the clients identity (ie their SIP identity).
6. Server responds with appropriate error message or grants access.
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WWW-Authenticate: IdentityBased
realm = "qut.com",
nonce = "dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093",
opaque = "5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41",
time = "12-12-2005 03:24:12",
signature = "base64(s(realm|nonce|opaque|time|ClientID,TA_Priv)"
Figure 3: ID-based Authentication Challenge
Authorization: IdentityBased
username = "client@qut.com",
realm = "qut.com",
nonce = "dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093",
opaque = "5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41",
response = "base64(e(username|realm|nonce|opaque,A,B_Priv)"
Figure 4: ID-based Authentication Response
4.1.3 Changes to Protocol
A new HTTP authentication dialogue will be introduced, a simplified example is seen
in Figure 2. Note, for the sake of illustration, not all information is displayed in the
diagram. A full ID-based authentication challenge-response is shown in Figures 3 and 4
respectively.
An attacker observing the handshake will be able to replay the server challenge to
the client however a client should ignore nonces that have been used previously for this
security domain. Also, an attacker could not impersonate a server by issuing a new
challenge as an attacker would not have knowledge of the private key, sj. Therefore, the
attacker could not issue a correctly signed challenge. Furthermore, an attacker observing
the client response will be able to decrypt the response, however this does not gain the
attacker any advantage due to the asymmetric nature of ID-based cryptography.
4.2 A New Key Agreement Protocol for SIP
Alice Proxies Bob
INVITE, Sign(TA,To,From,...)
−−−−−−−→
OK, Sign(TB,To,From,...)
←−−−−−−−
Figure 5: Example ID-based Key Agreement
Support for cryptographic protection of the VoIP media session is possible using SRTP
but SRTP requires a preestablished shared secret. A key agreement protocol is required to
establish this shared secret, however no such facility exists within SIP. Additionally, ID-
based cryptography allows a key agreement to occur where the only knowledge required
is the entities public identity, in this case, their SIP identity.
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This new key agreement protocol for SIP uses the provably secure implementation of
the improved CK key agreement protocol 3 and provides implicit authentication of both
parties at the end of the handshake, an ability to provide key escrow for law enforcement
and a non-repudiation quality, whilst ensuring that the operation remains consistent with
the requirements of RFC3261: Session Initiation Protocol.
4.2.1 Additional Assumptions
In addition to the assumptions outlined in Section 4.1.1 it is assumed that each entity
has a secure means of randomly choosing a and b.
4.2.2 Description
Every SIP subscriber is identifiable by their SIP address, eg alice@a.com, and that their
public key is a secure hash of that identity. To describe the implementation of the
modified Chen–Kudla protocol using SIP messaging, a worked example is explained here
to identify the messages being sent. This example consists of two users, Alice and Bob,
who are members of separate security domains, with SIP identities alice@a.com and
bob@b.com respectively. Each security domain has a proxy server through which all SIP
messaging will pass, and a Trusted Authority (TA) which issues ID-based private keys.
Furthermore, a Registrar server will also exist within the security domain to provide
REGISTER services, it is likely that the Proxies and Registrar will share a common TA so
that the same credentials are used by both services.
Our example will involve Alice making a call to Bob, each with no prior knowledge
of the other, other than Alice knowing Bob’s SIP identity. For simplicity, Alice will
not authenticate to her security domains proxy, although in a real implementation the
authentication steps explained in the preceding section would occur.
Step One Alice chooses ephemeral private key a and calculates TA = aP , which is
her contribution to the exchange. Alice then prepares a standard SIP INVITE message
and adds TA to the SDP message using a third party attribute. To ensure integrity
of the message, Alice then computes a signature over the entire message (sans Request-
URI, Via, Record-Route, Route, Max-Forwards, and Proxy-Authorization) using SA, and
places this at the end of the SDP message. This message is then sent to Alice’s configured
Proxy for routing to Bob’s security domain.
Step Two Bob receives the INVITE from his Proxy, and verifies the integrity of the
message after calculating QA from Alice’s identity located in the From: header and then
sends the appropriate RINGING message to Alice via appropriate proxies. It is possible
that an adversary M could change the From: header and recompute the signature using
a new private key SM however the change would be apparent to Bob in that Bob would
be under the impression he was talking to M not Alice. Since the perceived partner of
Bob is M and not Alice, therefore, the session keys established by both Alice and Bob at
the end of the protocol execution will not be the same (recall that the keying materials
of the session key comprises identities of the perceived partners)
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Step Three If Bob accepts the call, he chooses an ephemeral private key b and calcu-
lates TB = bP which he sends to Alice in the OK message in the same way as Alice sent
TA in Step One, signed the same way as in Step One.
Step Four Alice receives Bob’s OK message and verifies the integrity of the message
after calculating QB from Bob’s SIP identity. If the signature is correct, Alice responds
to Bob with an ACK message. This signals that both parties are in agreement to begin
the key establishment, which is the computationally expensive part of the protocol.
Step Five Alice can now compute
KAB = eˆ(SA, TB)eˆ(QB, aPPub(TA2))
MKA = H(A||B||T rA||KAB)
and Bob can compute
KBA = eˆ(SB, TA)eˆ(QA, bPPub(TA1))
MKB = H(A||B||T rB||KBA)
= MKA
so therefore
MKB = MKA = MK
Note that T rA and T rB denoted a concatenation of the messages sent between the
two parties. When this was introduced earlier in Figure 1, these messages were only TA
and TB, however, our implementation uses a concatenation of all the messages that were
sent and received during the handshake (with the exception of the headers that will be
changed by intermediary proxies). This creates an implicit integrity check and provides
additional assurances that the messages have not been tampered with or that a session
hijacking has occured.
Finally both parties can now utilise MK with the standard SRTP protocol to derive
the four keys necessary to encrypt and integrity check the media session and control
session, after which encrypted streaming can begin.
4.2.3 Changes to Protocol
A simplified INVITE handshake is shown in Figure 5, note that for the sake of illustration,
that some messages have been removed that are not relevant to the key agreement process.
Inserting two additional attributes into the SDP message facilitates the transmission of
each parties ephemeral keys TA and TB, and to allow transport of the necessary signatures.
Following is an example of the two additional attributes:
a=idaka: base64(TA or TB)
a=signature: base64(signature)
As RFC2327 defines the a attribute for use in describing session attributes, as well
as allowing zero or more instances of that attribute, it was a reasonable choice to carry
key agreement messages. However, it is possible that a new attribute type could be
introduced to support authenticated key agreement, but doing so would not change the
algorithm, just the formatting within the message.
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5 Discussion
The new ID-based SIP authentication mechanism and key agreement protocol proposed
here meets the goal and requirements stated above. The cryptographic primitives used
to provide the assurances are provably secure in the adversarial model of the BR93 model
which assumes an all-powerful adversary that is in control of all communication links with
the ability to manipulate any message sent and impersonate any other party. That is, the
adversary is capable of performing Man-in-the-Middle and session hijacking attacks (i.e.,
known key security), as well as spoofing and identity-based attacks. Since the proposed
protocol is proven secure in the BR93 model, it is capable of withstanding these attacks.
The new authentication mechanism proposed in this paper introduces a new dialog for
authentication, but only introduces one additional field into the existing authentication
message, namely, the field to hold a signature. The additional changes involve how
existing fields are interpreted by the parties involved and remain consistent in form with
the appropriate RFC. Furthermore, the new key agreement protocol recommended in this
paper does not introduce any new fields into the SDP message but makes use of existing
fields in such a manner that is still within the bounds of their scope according to the
RFC. It is expected that both of these changes will still be functional in the event that
intermediary proxies have no understanding of the new additions.
Non-repudiation, protection against replay and session hijacking attacks, and mutual
authentication are by-products from the use of ID-based cryptography and signatures.
Provided that the assumptions of the private keys remain secure hold true, then a high
level of assurance can be provided to the involved parties that all calls are genuine, and
that all parties are truthfully represented. An additional benefit that the new key agree-
ment protocol provides is a key escrow mechanism for use by law enforcement with the
appropriate procedural oversight at the expense of users’ privacy. Law enforcement can
obtain the derived session keys by observing the key agreement handshake and “colluding”
with the relevant TA’s to compute the master key.
It has been shown that SIP lacks basic security constructs and the new authentica-
tion mechanism and key agreement protocol introduced in this paper is a step towards
addressing these concerns. However, a number of limitations are apparent in the use of
ID-based cryptography to provide this solution.
Firstly, this new scheme is suited to a security domain environment, such as would
exist within a company, institution, or customers with a service provider. It is not
suited to provide protection for peer-to-peer type connections as would be experienced
if Alice was to contact Bob directly, irrespective of their various security domains. This
is because no Trusted Authority exists to issue private keys. Because SIP is required
to work in a P2P manner this restriction means only a subset of SIP’s functionality is
possible. However, real world implementations of SIP are unlikely to use the P2P method
of operation beyond casual communication amongst parties who are likely to have some
out of band relationship, which could be used to distribute keying material securely. Also,
related to this limitation is the support for conference calling. At present the use of the
new solution when more than two parties are present in a call has not been investigated.
This is an area for future work.
As explained in 4.1.1 the system relies on the assumption that TA’s are trustworthy
and would not collude. As a TA is incorporated within the entity that provides SIP
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services to a user it is reasonable to assume an existing trust relationship with that ser-
vice provider. Nothing exists to prevent TA’s colluding within the protocol, but such an
action would have economic and legal ramifications to the TA. It was stated earlier that
law enforcement with the appropriate oversight can compel a TA’s to ”‘wilfully collude”’
so that a wiretap can occur, but this would occur within an appropriate legislative frame-
work. It could be argued that a communication system that prevents legitimate wiretaps
is preferable, but such a system while technically possible would not be publicly viable
due to the wiretap requirements of the various Telecommunications Acts.
Another limitation is VoIP to PSTN calls; that is calls, that originate within a VoIP
network but are to be terminated in the PSTN. Calls of this nature (and PSTN to VoIP
calls for that matter) make use of Media Gateways. There is a potential vulnerability
in the new scheme when access to the PSTN is required as the authentication and key
agreement is being performed by the Media Gateway and not the PSTN user. Therefore,
no assurance of identity can be given to either party. It is likely that traditional tele-
phony users will have a relationship with a PSTN service provider that provides access to
a Media Gateway. Assurance can then be given to the VoIP user to the fact that there is
a contractually binding agreement between a PSTN address (+61730005000@phonecom-
pany.com.au) and the owner of that phone number, however, the security of such an
assurance depends upon the assumption the phone company will act honestly.
The assurances provided by the new authentication mechanism and key agreement
protocol do have a performance cost. Even though elliptic curve cryptosystems have
performance benefits rising from a reduced key size when compared with RSA-based
schemes, the operations required by ID-based elliptic curve cryptography has a significant
performance impact as explained below.
The proposed solution requires the use of three different elliptic curve operations;
addition, multiplication, and pairings. In addition, a secure hash function, and the ability
to randomly choose points from an appropriate finite field are also required. Hashing, and
choosing points are computationally inexpensive operations, point addition is somewhat
more expensive than hashing, but still relatively inexpensive. Point multiplication is more
expensive again (as its based upon point addition), and finally, pairings are considerably
expensive and should be avoided where possible due to the fact one pairing requires at
least ten times more multiplications in the underlying finite field than one multiplication
[2]. Unfortunately, elliptic curve pairings are what makes ID-based cryptography possible
and cannot be avoided by an ID-based cryptosystem.
Entity authentication involves two elliptic curve pairings and two hashes in addition
to the operations required by RFC3261. As the protocol is symmetric the cost is the
same to both initiator and responder.
The key agreement process performed during the INVITE sequence has two distinct
phases, the first phase ensures each party possesses the necessary information while the
second phase performs the actual key agreement. During establishment the caller and
callee are both required to choose a point on the curve, perform one point multiplication,
two hashes, and two curve pairings. It should be noted that the hashes and pairings are
required for the message signatures, and not necessary for the key agreement itself. The
final calculation to calculate the shared key requires two additional curve pairings, two
multiplications, and one hash to be performed by both the caller and callee.
All operations are symmetric, however in practical implementations it is most likely
13
that the caller will need to perform at least one authentication during a call establishment,
therefore making the real world protocol slightly asymmetric with the caller being required
to perform an additional two curve pairings and two hashes.
While the operations to be performed are extensive, it is only performed during call
establishment. Users will notice a delay from the call being answered and media streaming
beginning. Once the media stream begins however no call degradation will occur beyond
what is already experienced in VoIP telephony.
6 Conclusions
Introducing current state of the art cryptographic research in ID-based cryptosystems
to the authentication and key agreement problems that exist in SIP has been discussed.
This solution requires only minimal changes to the standard and achieve a much higher
standard of security and assurance for users and service providers alike and utilises the
provably secure improved ID-based protocol of Chen & Kudla. The new authentication
mechanism and key agreement protocol presented here address the lack of secure authen-
tication support in SIP as well as the lack of a key agreement protocol by providing a
provably secure solution using ID-based cryptography.
A number of avenues for future work have also been identified. Exploring avenues to
increase the performance of the protocol is an important piece of work yet to be done, as
the work presented here has only just begun to explore the possibilities. Three possible
solutions are: improved algorithms to perform elliptic curve operations, hardware assisted
calculations, and the use of a third party to perform the calculations during protocol runs.
It is essential that an implementation of the proposed protocol be developed. This
implementation can be used to obtain comparative performance metrics on a variety of
hardware and platforms can be observed. This is an immediate area of future work and
its acknowledged that such observations will be crucial in analysing the utility of the
ID-based authentication and key agreement protocols. It is evident that the operation
of this protocol in its entirety would be considerably processor intensive and is likely to
be unsuitable for mobile handsets at this point in time due to the expense of calculating
curve pairings. However, hardware designed and optimised for performing elliptic curve
operations has been developed and the adoption of this by handset manufacturers will
mitigate against these issues. An ideal solution would be offloading the expensive curve
pairings to a high powered third party without affecting the security of the protocol.
Another aspect of future work is further extending the protocol to support roaming
environments as would be experienced by a wireless device. This would involve multiple
security domains and trust relationships as well as requiring a secure method for remu-
neration and billing between service providers who provide network access to customers
of other providers.
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